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Patients’ safety has become a major issue for clinicians and the analysis of risk in medi-
cine is essential to increase the quality of patient 
care. An incident reporting system for anesthesia 
has been recommended to measure undesirable 
events. However, the use of incident reporting 
systems is under-utilized 1 and ranges from 4% to 
85%.2 Several methods to identify serious events 
(clinical record review, current data review, in-
terviews, incident reporting and checklist) have 
been employed in clinical practice as stated by 
the Working Group of the World Health Or-
ganization (http://www.who.int/patientsafety/
research/methods_measures/rapid_assessment_
methods/en/index.html). Each method has its 
peculiar limitations and it is difficult to compare 
data obtained with different methods.
Medical incidents are usually measured per 
number/frequency of events and frequently de-
scribed in three domains: categories of incident 
according to Catchpole et al.3 gravity according 
to Failure Mode And Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
Scale 4 and contributing factors as defined by 
Vincent et al.5 It is also important to frame the 
problem in the chronological phase of the pro-
cess in which it occurs.6 Even though these items 
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Background. Several methods are reported in the literature to analyze medically undesirable events during hospital 
care. Each method has several limitations, so no one has been defined as the standard tool to be able to detect failure 
during a medical process. The aim of this study was to compare an anesthesiological perioperative checklist with 
traditional Regional Incident Reporting (RIR) form in detecting and describing failures.
Methods. We analyzed RIR number of reports, seriousness and contributing factors. We also analyzed anesthe-
siological checklist data for: number of reports, seriousness of incident, contributing factors and distribution in 
macro-phases.
Results. We screened 2681 patients who underwent gynecological and obstetrical surgeries. RIR showed only the 
most harmful events in 0.4% of surgeries. Conversely, we recorded 135 failures with anesthesiological checklists 
(3.3%), of which 123 (91.1%) were solved. Categories of incident in checklists were: failures for medical device/
equipment (N.=30, 22.2%), for treatment/procedures (N.=25, 18.5%), for clinical assessment (N.=22, 16.2%), 
for consent/communication (N.=19, 14%), for medication (N.=16, 11.8%) and for documentation (N.=8, 5.9%). 
Ninety-four failures (69.6%) resulted in no harm for the patient, 41 (30.3%) in reversible damage and there were no 
cases of permanent damage/death. Contributing factors in checklists were mainly related to team (43.7%), task fac-
tors (28.1%) and work environment (22.2%). Failures detected in macro-phases were related to: clinical assessment 
(31.8%), presurgical re-assessment (23.7%), preparation for anesthesia (30.3%), anesthesia conduction (8.8%) and 
awakening (5.1%).
Conclusion. An anesthesiological checklist compared with traditional RIR provided a more sensible and complete 
framework for incident analysis during the perioperative period in patients undergoing gynecological and obstetrical 
surgeries. (Minerva Anestesiol 2014;80:913-21)
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are part of a defined framework for analysis of 
medical risk, no papers have been reported about 
voluntary reporting in anesthesiology, measur-
ing frequency of incident and analyzing together 
the category of incident, the gravity and the con-
tributing factors. Also there is no universally ac-
cepted definition of risks through the term “inci-
dent”, “accident”, “error”, “mistake” or ”event”.
At the beginning of 2009 we tested a first 
draft of a perioperative checklist to promote in-
cident reporting but we obtained poor data be-
cause items listed were scarce (presented in the 
7th National Convention of Surgical Graduate 
School, 20-22 May 2010, Villach, Austria). We 
decided to implement our first draft with new 
items according to a checklist suggested for the 
intraoperative stage by the Italian Society of An-
esthesiology and Intensive Care (http://www.
siaarti.it/scientifica/pdf_img/checklist.pdf ).
The aim of this study was to compare an an-
esthesiological perioperative checklist with the 
traditional Regional Incident Reporting (RIR) 
form, routinely used, in detecting and describ-
ing failures.
Materials and methods
Local Research Ethic Committee approval 
was obtained for the study. This study retrospec-
tively analyzed the period between May 2010 
and April 2011.
In that period, ward staff (nurses and doc-
tors) and operating room team (surgeons, an-
esthesiologists and nurses) recorded, as usually, 
RIR forms. RIR was a form defined as Incident 
Reporting according to International standard 
forms. It was a non-specific form for anesthesia, 
through which all the operators of the wards and 
operating rooms could report any adverse events 
and near misses. It consisted of three parts: in the 
first part operators should provide information 
about the Unit and the place where the event 
happened; in the second part operators freely 
describe the incident, possibly contributing fac-
tors, factors that may have reduced the outcome 
and the need for additional therapies or diagnos-
tic tests; in the third part the head of the Unit 
defined the severity and the possibility of future 
occurrence of the event. This instrument, thus 
completed, in anonymous form, was forwarded 
to the Regional Agency of Health Authority. We 
analyzed RIR number of reporting, seriousness 
and contributing factors as defined above.
In the same period, the checklist was used as 
a track to be followed by the anesthesiologist 
and completed if a failure was detected. An-
esthesiologist used the checklist in two distinct 
phases. Phase 1 – upon arrival in the operat-
ing room (OR), the anesthesiologist checks the 
record prior to admission to the OR; and Phase 
2 – the patient record from OR arrival until OR 
discharge. All patients were undergoing gyneco-
logic/obstetric surgery.
Both RIR and checklists were filled in in real 
time and reviewed at a later date.
According to the organizational model,5 a 
report made through a single checklist was de-
fined as an incident, every area completed on the 
checklist was a failure and an incident could be 
made of multiple failures. Anesthesiologists re-
ported all failures that happened in the patient’s 
operative process using the checklist and failures 
solved were reported as well.
We analyzed the following data from the 
checklists: number of checklists filled, number 
of failures detected, number of failures solved; 
temporal distribution of checklist collected. We 
organized data in the 3 categories described for a 
system approach: number of failures in some of 
the categories of incidents according to Catch-
pole et al.3 gravity of failures according to the 
FMEA scale 4 and contributing factors according 
to Vincent et al.5 Severity of failures was defined 
as follows: level 1 failures (no harm) were consid-
ered “near misses”, whereas adverse events were 
divided in two groups: reversible (level 2-7 fail-
ures) and permanent, from injury to death (level 
8-10 failures).7 All categories were calculated 
both for detected and solved failures.
Moreover, we made an analysis of failures 
in the macro-phases with the checklists of the 
whole perioperative process: clinical assessment 
(items related to anesthesia visit as outpatient), 
presurgical reassessment (items related to re-eval-
uation by the anesthesiologist the day before sur-
gery), preparation for anesthesia (items related 
to environment, equipment and patient’s check 
in OR), anesthesia conduction (items related to 
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Table I.—Checklist adopted.
Macrophase 1: Clinical 







Anesthesiological record □ □
Modification of pharmacological therapy □ □
Choice of anesthesia □ □
Information on pain therapy □ □
Informed consent (anesthesia\blood) □ □
Macrophase 2:





Surgery schedule validation □ □
Information to\from the 
patient
Re-information to the patient □ □
DVT prophylaxis □ □
Check pharmacological therapy □ □
Increased LRA risk □ □
Planning for transfusion Ask for type and screen □ □
Ask for blood\plasma product □ □
Premedication Drug prescription □ □
Macrophase 3: Preparation Item to check Operator Failure detected Failure solved
Preoperative check __:__
__/__/__
Surgical room and anesthesiological devices
Surgical room: asepsis, temperature □ □
Anesthesia devices availability □ □
Particular anesthesia devices availability
Emergency devices availability □ □
Defibrillator □ □
Ventilator □ □
Ambu bag □ □
Suction equipment □ □
Rotameters □ □
Vaporizer □ □
Oxygen cylinder □ □
Active warming devices □ □
Peculiar equipments for specific anesthesia □ □
Vital parameters monitoring systems □ □
General anesthesia trolley
Anesthesia drugs availability □ □
Emergency drugs availability □ □
Fluids □ □
Tracheal intubation devices □ □
Difficult intubation devices □ □
Emergency devices □ □
Artery\vein catheters □ □
Naso-gastric tube □ □




Dermographic pencil □ □
Disinfection and protection equipment
Devices for epidural\subarachnoid anesthesia □ □
Peripheral nerve blockade devices □ □
Blood products availability □ □
ICU bed availability □ □
Patient admission ID and documentation □ □
Persistence of eligibility conditions □ □
Nursing: presence of dental prosthesis, nail van-
ish, jewels, make up, hygiene
□ □
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Table I.—Checklist adopted.
Macrophase 1: Clinical 
assessment Time and date Item to check Operator
Failure 
detected Failure solved
Patient preparation Positioning on surgical bed □ □
Artery\vein catheter positioning □ □
Bladder catheter positioning □ □
Monitoring of vital parameters □ □
Pre-surgical prophylaxis Antibiotic prophylaxis (short term) □ □
PONV prophylaxis □ □
Aspiration prophylaxis □ □
Stress ulcer prophylaxis □ □
Macrophase 4a: General 





Choice of induction technique\drugs □ □
Pre-oxygenation □ □
Neuromuscular blockade □ □
Airways Tracheal intubation (technique) □ □
Alternative devices for intubation use □ □
Difficult intubation □ □
Fixing □ □
Connection to the machine Check connection and working of ventilator □ □
Maintenance of anesthesia Choice of maintenance drugs □ □
Intraoperative monitoring (Neurological, RS, 
CVS, T°)
□ □
Active warming □ □
Fluids administration □ □
Blood products transfusion □ □
Adjunctive drugs and procedures □ □
Malignant hyperthermia □ □
Confirm ICU bed □ □




Surgical bed\hospital bed transfer □ □
Anesthesia record □ □
Macrophase 4b:
Loco-regional anesthesia Item to check Operator
Failure 
detected Failure solved
Preparation to LRA __:__
__/__/__
Choice of drug □ □
Choice of level\extension of blockade □ □
Execution of anesthesia Sterile preparation of trolley □ □
Skin disinfection and sterile field □ □
Loco-regional anesthesia execution □ □
Loco-regional anesthesia effectiveness □ □
Patient repositioning for surgery □ □
Maintenance of anesthesia Choice of maintenance drugs □ □
Intraoperative monitoring (Neurological, RS, 
CVS, T°)
□ □
Treatment of complications □ □
Active warming □ □
Fluids administration □ □
Blood products transfusion □ □
Adjunctive drugs and procedures □ □
Malignant hyperthermia □ □
Confirm ICU bed □ □
ontinues fr m previous page.
Macrophase 3: Preparation
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detected also using checklists. We recorded an 
average of 7.5 checklists completed per month. 
From July to September 34 checklists were com-
pleted (37.7% of the 90 checklists reporting in-
cidents). There was an increase in reporting until 
August, a progressive drop in October, a smaller 
peak in November and then a progressive drop 
until February (Figure 1).
Failures detected and solved are shown in 
Table II. In terms of frequency, failures were 
categorized as to: medical device/equipment 
(N.=30, 22.2%), treatment/procedures (N.=25, 
18.5%), clinical assessment (N.=22, 16.2%), 
consent/communication (N.=19, 14%), medi-
cation (N.=16, 11.8%) and documentation 
(N.=8, 5.9%). Some failures (11.1%) did not 
match with the categories described. It was more 
difficult to solve problems in consent/communi-
cation, treatment/procedures and in documenta-
tion.
Ninety-four failures (69.6%) were considered 
to be level 1 in severity; 41 failures (30.3%) in 
level 2-7 (with levels 4 and 5 being the most 
common), while no events were recorded in lev-
el 8-10 gravity. Contributing factors were more 
frequently related to team (N.=59, 43.7%), task 
factors (N.=38, 28.1%) and work environment 
(N.=30, 22.2%). Individual (N.=4, 2.9%) and 
maneuvers during anesthesia), awakening (items 
related to the recovery room) and OR discharge 
(items related to transfer plan and postoperative 
pain management) (Table I). Distribution of the 
severity grades was also analyzed according to its 
distribution in macro-phases and months (Table 
I).
Anesthesiologists received a preliminary train-
ing on the checklist use in April 2010. In Octo-
ber 2010, December 2010 and February 2011 
retraining meetings were performed.
To analyze the data, descriptive statistics were 
used reporting the observations as the number of 
observations (N.) and percentages (%).
Results
We analyzed 2681 gynecological and obstetri-
cal surgical operations, the total number of oper-
ations carried out by our department of anesthe-
sia in a year. RIR collected 12 reports (0.4% of 
2681) with 27 failures. All failures were recorded 
among levels of gravity from 4 to 7. Contrib-
uting factors were: team (55.5%), task factors 
(29.6%), individual (7.4%) and patient (7.4%).
Ninety checklists reported incidents (3.3% of 
2681) with 135 failures; of those 123 (91.1%) 
have been solved. All failures in the RIR were 
Table I.—Checklist adopted.
Macrophase 1: Clinical 
assessment Time and date Item to check Operator
Failure 
detected Failure solved
First anesthesia recovery Start pain therapy □ □
Surgical bed\hospital bed transfer □ □
Anesthesia record □ □
Macrophase 5: Awakening Item to check Operator Failure detected Failure solved
Recovery room __:__
__/__/__
Active warming ongoing □ □
Pharmacological therapy ongoing □ □
Monitoring ongoing □ □
Emergency equipments and devices □ □
Emergency drugs □ □
Prevention and treatment of postoperative 
complications
□ □
Macrophase 6: Discharge Item to check Operator Failure detected Failure solved




Patient discharge and transfer plan □ □
Planning of post-operative pain therapy □ □
Damage for the patient:
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ontinues fr m previous page.
4b:
Loco-regional anesthesia
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levels of gravity, including 100% of failures in 
level 6 and 50% of level 7.
Discussion
The main finding of our retrospective analysis 
of the use of a checklist was that it was more 
sensitive than the standard RIR reporting for the 
detection of process failures. Moreover, there was 
better definition of the severity of failures and 
their remediation. Regional System of Incident 
Reporting achieved lower percentage of report 
(0.4% vs. 3.3%), and its system registered only 
adverse events (level 4-7) whilst the checklist 
gave a more complete map of failures: our data 
shows that RIR is less worthwhile than checklist 
in pointing out perioperative anesthesiological 
risk. Moreover, the checklist allowed us also to 
detect and calculate the percentage of solving for 
each failure.
Criticisms of the RIR in our view are as fol-
lows: it is not a specific tool for the reality of 
anesthesia and also in reporting the event a free 
text description may not always provide an accu-
rate timing. As regards the checklist, the value of 
the identified failure would probably have been 
greater if the checklist had been used in a proac-
tive manner and not only as a guide for identify-
ing the events. Moreover, the checklist reflects 
patient (N.=4, 2.9%) factors were less frequent. 
No report about institutional or management 
was found as a contributing factor (Table II).
Individual or patient factors, as defined by 
Vincent et al.5 were the most common causes of 
failed resolutions (Table II).
Of the total of 135 failures, failures were 
detected in macro-phases: 43 for clinical as-
sessment (31.8%), 32 for presurgical reassess-
ment (23.7%), 41 for preparation to anesthesia 
(30.3%), 12 for anesthesia conduction (8.8%) 
and 7 for awakening (5.1%). No failures were 
recorded at OR discharge phase. The percentage 
of failures solved in the macro-phases was high 
for clinical assessment, presurgical reassessment, 
preparation for anesthesia and awakening. Dur-
ing the conduct of anesthesia only 66.6% of fail-
ures were solved and therefore the highest levels 
of harm were recorded.
In detail, the percentage of near misses/failures 
detected in macro-phases was higher in the clini-
cal assessment (84.4%), presurgical reassessment 
(66.6%), preparation for anesthesia (67.5%) 
and awakening (85.7%). During anesthesia near 
misses were only 23% of failures while adverse 
events were at the higher percentage of 76.9% 
(all in levels 4-7). Gravity by months was vari-
able (Figure 1), even though September had 
been more heterogeneous, showing 5 different 
Figure 1.—Checklists collected: N. and gravity per month.
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ports of the use of reporting instruments 8, 9 due 
to the lack of a common denominator (number 
and type of surgery) in most of them.
Categories of incident in Table II were useful 
to underline the specific causes of failure; catego-
the patient’s medical record, if an event was not 
reported in the medical record it could not be 
clearly identified with the checklist. Both sys-
tems have the limitation of being voluntary.
It is difficult to compare results with other re-
Table II.—Comparison between failures detected and solved.




Clinical assessment 43 40 93.02%
Presurgical reassesment 32 29 90.62%
Preparation to anesthesia 41 39 95.12%
Anesthesia 12 8 66.67%
Awakening 7 7 100%
Discharge 0 0 0%
Total 135 123 91.11%




Clinical assessment 22 21 95.45%
Consent/communication 19 15 78.95%
Documentation 8 7 87.50%
Medical device/equipment 30 30 100%
Medication 16 15 93.75%
Treatment/procedures 25 21 84%
Others 15 14 93.33%
Total 135 123 91.11%




Level 1 94 92 97.87%
Level 2 1 1 100%
Level 3 0 0 0%
Level 4 21 21 100%
Level 5 12 6 50%
Level 6 3 3 100%
Level 7 4 0 0%
Level 8 0 0 0%
Level 9 0 0 0%
Level 10 0 0 0%
Total 135 123 91.11%
Near misses 94 92 97.87%
Levels 2-7 41 31 75.61%
Levels 8-10 0 0 0%




Institutional context 0 0 0%
Organisational 0 0 0%
Work environment 30 30 100%
Team factors 59 53 89.83%
Individual factors 4 1 25%
Task factors 38 36 94.74%
Patient characteristics 4 3 75%
Total 135 123 91.11%
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tion and patient safety.11 The rise in reports ob-
served after the 2/3 retraining meetings (Novem-
ber and March) seemed to confirm that sharing 
the knowledge about safety measures enhances 
voluntary reporting. According to the World 
Health Organization guidelines checklists and 
incident reporting forms have to be used by a 
trained team.12
Conclusions
The introduction of the checklist allowed us 
to obtain a better framework for the analysis 
of risk in medical perioperative anesthesiologi-
cal care in our Unit, compared to the RIR use. 
To best minimize negative outcomes, our results 
suggest that improvements should be made in 
what precedes and follows surgery and not only 
in the operating room.
Key messages
 — Use of a checklist has proven to be 
more sensitive in identifying failures com-
pared with traditional incident reporting 
form; it provided a better quantitative and 
qualitative description of the failures and 
identified the time frame of their occurrence 
in the perioperative period.
 — Causes of failure represented more 
were medical device/equipment and treat-
ment/procedures.
 — Failures detected were more common 
in macro-phases before the induction of an-
esthesia, but the most harmful ones were 
intra-operative.
 — Temporal trend of incidents and their 
gravity suggested that months with high ro-
tation of anesthesiologists due to holidays 
(July-September) were more critical and it 
was a high factor affecting the team perfor-
mance.
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st
rib
ut
e 
th
e 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 c
op
y 
of
 t
he
 a
rt
ic
le
 t
hr
ou
gh
 o
nl
in
e 
in
te
rn
et
 a
nd
/o
r 
in
tr
an
et
 f
ile
 s
ha
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s,
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
m
ai
lin
g 
or
 a
ny
 o
th
er
m
ea
ns
 w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 a
llo
w
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 t
he
 A
rt
ic
le
.T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
al
l o
r 
an
y 
pa
rt
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 fo
r 
an
y 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 U
se
 is
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
.T
he
 c
re
at
io
n 
of
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e 
w
or
ks
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 A
rt
ic
le
 is
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
.T
he
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 r
ep
rin
ts
 fo
r 
pe
rs
on
al
 o
r 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 u
se
 is
no
t 
pe
rm
itt
ed
.I
t 
is
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
 t
o 
re
m
ov
e,
 c
ov
er
, 
ov
er
la
y,
 o
bs
cu
re
, 
bl
oc
k,
 o
r 
ch
an
ge
 a
ny
 c
op
yr
ig
ht
 n
ot
ic
es
 o
r 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 P
ub
lis
he
r 
m
ay
 p
os
t 
on
 t
he
 A
rt
ic
le
.I
t 
is
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
 t
o 
fr
am
e 
or
 u
se
 f
ra
m
in
g 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 t
o 
en
cl
os
e 
an
y 
tr
ad
em
ar
k,
 lo
go
,
or
 o
th
er
 p
ro
pr
ie
ta
ry
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 P
ub
lis
he
r.
